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Abstract
Unlike the well-developed  literature  on the employment  border. They  use household  level labor market data to
impact of the minimum wage  in industrial nations,  very  establish compliance with the  legislation.  They obtain
little is known  about min1imum wage effects  in  low  matched  difference-in-difference  estimates of the
income countries.  Minimumii  wages  increased  shiarply  in  employment  impact using a census of all large and
Indonesia  between  1990 and  1996 and by more  in  some  medium-size  firms  in the  clothing, textile, leather,  and
provinces  than in  others.  Following Card  and Krueger  footwear  industries.  Alatas and  Cameron  find some
(1994)  the authors  exploit the large geographic  variation  evidence of a negative employment  impact for  small,
in the  rate of increase  and compare  chaniges  in  domestic  firms but no employment  impact  for large
employment in  the clothing,  textile, footwear,  and  firms, foreign or domestic.
leather  industries on either  side of the Jakarta-West  Java
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1.  Introduction
The debate over the employment impact of minimum wage increases has been
reincarnated  with vigor over the past decade.  The general wisdom that there is a negative
impact on employment is being subject to serious re-examination. Almost all of this
research has however occurred in wealthy industrialized nations. Minimum wages are
also widely employed as a means of raising living standards in low income countries.  The
level at which they are set is often hotly contested  and concerns for the employment
impact taken into account. In addition to the domestic debates, minimum wage setting in
low-wage countries has become internationalized  with individuals and governments in
wealthy nations demanding higher wages be paid in developing countries  as a means of
limiting the exploitation of labor by multinational corporations and enhancing the
competitiveness of their own manufacturing  sectors. Low income countries are being
pressured via international trade organisations to increase their minimum wages or face
trade sanctions.'
It is thus surprising that there are only a few papers on the impact of minimum
wages on employment in developing countries. Labor market conditions in these
countries differ markedly from those in industrialized countries - most obviously in terms
of the existence of a large informal, uncovered sector. This makes the reliance on results
from industrialized nations unsatisfactory.
1  For exarnple,  Indonesia had complaints filed against it under the Generalized Scheme of Preferences  in an
attempt to deprive it of low tariffs on its exports to the US, Rama (1999).
1This paper uses data from a census of all medium and large Indonesian firms2 to
examine the impact of minimum wages on employment between  1990 and 1996.
Indonesia is an ideal site for a study of this sort.  It is a relatively low income country
(GDP/capita of US$980 in 1995) but has a large manufacturing  sector (as a result of a
manufacturing boom starting in the mid-80's).  Much of this sector is low-tech and low
wage - for example, clothing, textiles, footwear and leather. We will restrict our attention
to this sector because these industries rely heavily on low-wage, predominantly female,
labor. Indonesia has also had a long history of minimum wage legislation. Non-
compliance  with minimum wage laws is a much more serious issue in developing
countries than developed countries, owing to the much weaker government enforcement
capacity.  In Indonesia, the minimum wage legislation was largely unenforced prior to
1990. However,  since  1990 greater efforts have been put into establishing compliance
leading to the expectation that most middle-sized and large firms, at least around the
major metropolitan areas, would pay the minimum. We confirm this using labor survey
data.
Further, partly as a result of international pressure,  minimum wages have been
increasing sharply in Indonesia during the  1990's. On average minimum wages across the
nation tripled in nominal terms and doubled in real terms during the early 1  990s, Rama
(1999). More importantly for the purpose of this study, minimum wages are set at the
provincial level in Indonesia. This gives rise to arbitrary differences in the legal minimum
between firms that are geographically close but on different sides of provincial borders.  A
particularly striking difference in minimums occurs within the bounds of Greater Jakarta
(which is the manufacturing hub of Indonesia)  - part of which is in the province of
2 Medium and large firms are defined as having more than twenty employees.
2Jakarta and part in the neighboring province of West Java. In 1990 the minimum wage
was 36% higher in Jakarta than in West Java. By 1994 there was no difference  in
minimums across the two regions.  It is this provincial difference in minimum wages
which we exploit and allows us to identify the employment effect.
Finally, prior to the crisis, Indonesia had experienced considerable  international
capital  inflows. The manufacturing sector consists of domestic and multinational  firms.
(For example,  both Nike and Reebok manufacture in the Jakarta area.) We examine the
employment impact on domestic and foreign firms separately and so can comment on the
employment impact within the foreign-owned firms that are the source of much
international controversy.
This study advances the literature in a number of ways. First, it is only the second
study of which we are aware3 that uses micro-level  data to examine minimum wage
impacts in a developing country. Second,  it is the first developing country study to use
the difference-in-difference  approach  and so avoid the potentially problematic regression-
based method. (This will be discussed in more detail  below.) Third, the data set is
unusually detailed and covers all firms with more than twenty employees in Indonesia.
Finally, by covering a relatively long six year period this paper avoids thfe criticism of
previous difference-in-difference  studies which have been able to examine only a short
period around the minimum wage change.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses the previous
empirical literature.  Section 3 provides details on the Indonesian context.  In section 4
labor market survey data are used to establish the extent of compliance with the minimum
wage laws within Greater Jakarta and that the minimum wages are binding. Section 5
3  The only other being a study of Mexico  and Columbia by Bell (1997).
3then discusses the establishment level data that will be used to calculate the matched
difference-in-difference  estimates of the employment  impact - as explained in Section 6
and presented in Section 7. Section 8 then explores potential explanations for the results.
Section 9 concludes.
2.  Previous Literature
Theoretical  Structure
The simplest model of the effects of the minimum wage on employment is the
standard neo-classical model which assumes homogenous labor,  a competitive labor
market and complete coverage of the minimum wage legislation.  A minimum wage set
above the market-clearing wage then decreases the quantity of labor demanded by finns
and total employment decreases.  The assumption of complete coverage is a strong one,
even in a developed country setting, but will not hold in most developing country
settings. A number of theoretical  models have explored the impact of minimum wages in
the presence of a non-negligible uncovered sector. (See Welch (1976), Gramlich (1976),
Mincer (1976) and Brown, Gilroy and Kohen (1982), Harrison and Leamer (1995)).
Although these models differ in a number of ways - for example, in their assumptions
about mobility between the uncovered and covered sectors - they all predict the
conventional negative employment impact in the covered sector.4
As is well-known,  market structures other than perfect competition can result in
different predictions as to the minimum wage impact.  For example, if the labor market is
assumed to be monopsonistic, increases in the minimum wage over a certain range cause
employment to increase. Efficiency wage models can also explain such employment
4gains. In these models the efficiency gains associated with the increased  wages (due to
lower worker turnover or higher worker effort, for example) outweigh the increased wage
costs and the firm can afford to employ more waorkers  at the new wage. Other possible
explanations for an insignificant or positive employment impact are explored below in
Section 8.
Notwithstanding  the existence of the alternative  models, the perfectly  competitive
labor market model remains the benchmark model. It forms the basis of most policy
advice and generates the negative employment impact that many empirical papers seek to
quantify.
Empirical  Literature
The empirical literature on the employment impact in industrial  countries (see
Brown (1999) for a survey) can be characterized  as having two distinct strands.  The first
being earlier studies (using data prior to the. 1  980s) which were largely based on time-
series data. A measure of employment is regressed on a minimum wage variable and a
number of other controlling variables,  normally including some output measure that
purports to control for changes in economic conditions. These found a consistent
moderate negative employment impact - in line with the standard neo-classical model of,
the labor market.  This methodology is however open to a number of criticisms. First, the
minimum wage variable is normally calculated relative to average  earnings (and possibly
weighted by a measure of coverage). This captures the extent to which the minimum is
binding. However,  another consequence of this specification  is that the impact of
minimum wage variation cannot be separated from that of average wages. Second, these
4 They predict a reallocation  of labor towards the uncovered sector and differ in the extent to which this
5studies implicitly compare employment  in relatively high minimum wage years with
employment in relatively low minimum wage years, when it is likely that many other
factors, including economic conditions that affect employment and minimum wages,
have also changed over time. Studies normally try to control for these changes in
economic conditions by including a measure of gross  output as an explanatory variable.
However, it is likely that this control is inadequate.  To the extent that the GDP measures
are unable to completely control for changes in economic conditions, the minimum wages
are likely to be endogenous,  in which case the resultant estimates are biased.
The second strand of the literature consists of more recent studies which have
often utilized micro-data and largely found no negative impact on employment,  with
some indication that there may be employment gains associated with minimum wage
increases. At the center of this second group of studies is Card and Krueger (1994) which
examined the impact of a minimum wage increase in New Jersey by comparing
employment changes in fast-food outlets in that state with those in neighboring
Pennsylvania  where there was no increase in the minimum. It is this difference-in-
difference  methodology, which has not before been employed in a developing country
setting, that will be employed here. Even more recent time-series studies have shown a
very small or insignificant impact of minimum wage increases.
Developing Country  Studies
Unlike the literature on the impact of minimum wages in developed countries,
there is very little developing country research.  All of the studies that do exist use the
regression-based  methodological approach described above,  with differing degrees of
data aggregation. The results are mixed but the majority of the studies find a negative
decrease  in  covered sector employment  is compensated  by an increase in uncovered sector employment.
6employment impact. Carneiro (2000) found a negative employment impact in the formal
sector in Brazil using time-series data, as did Freeman and Freeman (1991) using national
and industry level data for Puerto Rico. Bell (1997) is the only study of which we are
aware that uses firm-level data. She finds a negative employment impact in Columbia
where the minimum wage is found to be binding and no impact in Mexico where the
minimum is set below market-clearing.
The recent large increases in minimum wages in Indonesia have generated a small
number of papers that have all used panels of provincial level data. Rarrma (1999)
aggregated his data up from the firm-level and found a negative employment effect for
small firms (less,  than twenty employees) but a possible positive effect amongst large and
medium-sized  firms. A SMERU Research Institute report (SMERU, 2001) conducted a
similar analysis using the household labor force survey data (Sakernas). They conclude
that increases in minimum wages between  1988 and 2000 have had a negative impact on
urban, formal sector employment.  However, a closer look at their range of estimates
suggests this relationship is not very robust. The employment impact switches between
being positive and negative depending on the sanple used and the way in which the
minimum wage variable is constructed. Islam and Nazara (2000) also conduct a
provincial level analysis for the whole of Indonesia and find that the results are sensitive
to the measure of the minimum wage used and the other controlling variables included in
the regression.
All of the above developing country studies used either panel or time-series
regressions and so are open to the aforementioned  criticisms. In addition to these
concerns, much information is lost in the aggregation of data up to the national, sub-
national or industry level. In contrast, this paper uses the difference-in-difference
7methodology of Card and Krueger (1994). This has the advantage of exploiting the
richness of firm-level data while also avoiding the pitfalls of the regression-based
approach.  Comparing like companies that receive different treatment on the basis of small
differences  in their geographic location provides a "natural experiment" that can be used
to assess the employment impacts of minimum wage legislation without having to worry
about the endogeneity problems associated with the regression-based approach.  Although
the difference-in-difference  approach  is like the panel regression approach in that it
compares employment in regions with differing minimum wages, by examining very
close geographic regions that constitute the same market 5 the problems associated with
differing economic conditions are avoided.
One of the more serious criticisms aimed at Card and Krueger (1994) was that they
were able to examine only a period from shortly before the minimum wage change to
shortly after the change and so captured only short term impacts of the minimum wage.
In this study we use data over a much longer time period and so are able to capture longer
term impacts of minimum wage increases.
3. Indonesian Context
Indonesia  is the fourth most populous country in the world. Its islands cover an
area greater than that of Europe. Due to its relatively low average  per capita income  its
economy is small in international  terms - only about 3% that of the United States.
Nevertheless, prior to the financial crisis of 1997 Indonesia was experiencing  a
manufacturing boom. Protectionist trade barriers  had been dramatically  reduced from
their high levels in the mid-1980's and the flow of foreign capital had also been
liberalized. As a result many multinational companies chose to locate in Indonesia and
5  As opposed to estimating regressions on data from different states within a nation, for example.
8exports of manufacturing goods boomed. Non-oil manufacturing.production  grew by an
average of 11% per annum between  1985 and 1992. Manufactured  exports grew by a
remarkable 20 to 30% per annum in real terms from 1980 to  1992, Hill (1996).
Indonesian manufacturing is unusually concentrated in the Greater Jakarta region.
Jabotabek is the term given to this region (taking its name from the first two letter of its
constituent regions - Jakarta, Bogor, Tangerang  and Bekasi.) Seventy-eight per cent of
national adult full-time manufacturing employment is concentrated on the island on Java,
with the vast majority of this being in or close to Jakarta.
Jakarta is a province in its own right.  The districts (kabupaten) of Bogor,
Tangerang and Bekasi (known as Botabek) are all in the province of West Java.  See
Figure  1.6 As such, firms in Jakarta are subject to the Jakarta legislated minimum while
firms just over the border are subject to the (historically lower) West Java minimum.
Table  1 presents the average monthly minimum wage in each province  in
Indonesian Rupiah.  The government sets monthly minimums for full time workers.  For
workers who do not work full-time, the corresponding pro-rata daily rates apply.  These
minimums apply to all firms, no matter how small but not to workers in the informal
sector. The Ministry of Manpower does not explicitly define the informal sector but it is
understood to include such occupational categories  as household servants and agricultural
laborers outside the estate sector, Rosner (1995).  In 1990 (with an exchange rate of
Rp2500 to US$1) the Jakarta minimum was equivalent to US$22.32 per month and so
significantly less than a dollar a day. This had risen to almost US$2 per day in 1996.
6 Jabotabek is  surrounded to the west, east and south by other districts in  West Java and to the north by the
Bay of Jakarta.  Unlike in Tangerang and Bekasi, most of the manufacturing in the kabupaten of Bogor is
located south of the city of Bogor which is quite a way from the Jakarta/West Java border. Excluding Bogor
from the sample does not affect the results.
9Although low by international standards, this is quite high relative to the average
manufacturing wage.  For example the Jakartan (Botabek) minimum was 42% (31.2%) of
the average manufacturing wage  in Jabotabek in 1991.  The minimum in both regions was
50% of the average wage by 1996.
Table  I shows that in 1990 the minimum wage was about 36% higher in Jakarta
than West Java. Both provinces have experienced relatively rapid increases in their
nominal (and real) minimum wages and there were larger increases in West Java so that
the gap between the two provinces has closed over time and there has been no difference
between the regions since  1994.8  The government's stated aim in establishing the level of
the provincial minimum wages is that they cover the cost of a defined consumption
bundle. Thus, in setting the minimum wage, regard was to be paid to these minimum
physical needs and the cost of living. The initial difference between the minimum wages
of Jakarta and West Java arose from differences in the average cost of living across the
two provinces. Jakarta is an entirely urban province  whereas West Java is largely rural.
Costs of living are consequently  higher in Jakarta than they are on average  in West Java
and the lower West Java minimum reflected this fact. However, Botabek (although within
West Java), like Jakarta, is urban and shares Jakarta's high costs of living. Figure  1 shows
there was comparable  manufacturing density in Jakarta, Tangerang  (to the west) and
Bekasi (to the east) in 1991  and there is no discernible changes as one drives from Jakarta
into West Java - other than the provincial markers at the side of the road. Henderson,
Kuncoro and Nasution (1996) document the very high labor mobility across the
7 The minimum  wage is  defined as including the 'basic wage' plus regular allowances (that are fixed every
month and do not depend on performance  or absence). The provision of the basic wage must amount to at
least 75% of the minimum wage.
s  Inflation averaged  9.6% per annum between  1990 and  1996  in Jakarta.  The real value of the Jakarta
minimum wage increased by 50% over the period and Botabek's more than doubled.
10Jakarta/Botabek border which indicates that they are part of an integrated market.
Historically, prior to its development,  costs in B3otabek may have been lower but our data
show that by 1990 there is no systematic difference between manufacturing  land rental
costs per worker in Jakarta and Botabek.9
This anomaly in the minimum wage setting process  has since been officially
recognized by the West Java government which now sets different minimum wages for
each of the four distinct regions in West Java (1Botabek  being one). Since then Botabek's
minimum has equalled Jakarta's, whereas  lower minimums were set for the other areas  in
West Java.
The different magnitudes of the increases in the minimum wages in Jakarta and
Botabek in the years 1990-1994 creates a natural experiment in which to assess the
impact of minimum wages on employment.  We are also able to use the period over which
the minimum is the same in both provinces to test the eligibility of our control group -
that is, to test whether there are systematic differences in changes in employment
between the two regions when the minimums are the same.
Possible  Endogeneity of the Minimum Wage Setting Process
Although the government's ultimate goal was that minimum wages should cover the cost
of a minimum needs consumption basket, local labor market conditions were explicitly
allowed to affect the speed at which the minimum reached the government's consumption
targets.' 0 The potential role for labor market conditions in the setting of the minimum
9  The rental costs data are not ideal as only total rental expenditure is  given and we do not know the size of
the rental property. We compared rentals costs per worker in Jakarta (for those firms that paid rent) with
those in Botabek.
1° Provincial tri-partite  councils (consisting of members fiom the provincial branch of the Miriistry of
Manpower,  employee and employer delegates) were instructed to take labor market conditions  into account
when making minimum wage recommendations  to the provincial  governor.  The governor then forwards the
11wage raises the possibility that the legislated minimums may be endogenous."I  An
advantage of the approach used in this study is that we do not need to rely on the
exogeneity of the wage setting process. Because both of the regions we examine are part
of the same market - Greater Jakarta - there are no market differences that can explain
the differences in the minimum wages. Also, as explained above, the initial difference in
the Jakarta and Botabek minimum wages was an anomaly arising from the overall
provincial level cost-of-living differential.
4.  The extent of compliance  and whether the minimum wage  is binding.
A number of authors have documented the increased attention paid to enforcing
compliance with the minimum wage legislation in Indonesia in the early  1  990s. Manning
(1998, p  117) writes that "From around  1990 onwards the institutional framework
changed significantly for modem sector firms. Increasing attention was paid by the
government to the implementation of provincial minimum wage legislation  ... , especially
those (firms) close to major cities."'2 Wild (1992, p  116) states that the evidence on
modem firms in Java "strongly suggests that urban and peri-urban industrial firms do pay
the minimum." The main enforcement mechanism of the Indonesian government is the
public "shaming" of companies that fail to comply. Non-compliers receive a tiny fine of
US$50 but are also blacklisted.  In order to be dropped from the blacklist, companies have
(possibly revised) recommendation  to the Ministry of  Manpower which has the final say. (This was the case
in the 1  990s but is likely to change under the current process of  decentralisation.)
" Rama (1999) argues that this is unlikely to be the case because  1)  the major impetus for the minimum
wage increases was pressure  from foreign governments (predominantly  the US) and that this was not at all
related to the Indonesian labor market;  2) the Indonesian government's targets were  based solely on the
consumption bundle; and 3) labor market conditions  seemed to play very little role in practice (provincial
minimums were not closely related to average provincial productivity and labor costs).
12  See also Rama (1999) and Rosner (1995).
12to "confess guilt and pledge to apology (sic.)", quote from The Indonesia Times in Rama
(1999).  Strikes by workers in non-complying firms are also part of the shaming process. 13
In addition to there being compliance,  the minimum wage must also be binding (set
above the market clearing wage) if it is to have an employment effect.  Table 2 provides
preliminary evidence that this is the case, For instance, it shows that between  1989 and
1996 the average  wage bill per worker in Botabek increased by 19.4 percentage points
more than it did in Jakarta. 1 4 We further confirm the anecdotal evidence  on compliance
and determine that the minimums were binding by examining the distribution of wages in
West Java and Jakarta. If the minimum wage is binding and being complied with then
those who were earning below the minimum will be pushed up to the minimum and a
discontinuity or spike should appear close to the minimum wage. The data used for this
exercise come from the Labor Force Survey (Survei Angkatan Keria Nasional =
Sakernas) which is conducted by the Indonesian Central Statistical Agency  (Badan Pusat
Statistik = BPS).  Since 1994 the survey has been conducted annually. 15 Prior to this it
was conducted quarterly.  The survey covers a random sample of the population. The
Sakernas sample consists of approximately 65,000 households, or slightly more than
250,000 individuals across the nation. Of these, there are approximately 2000 adults
working in manufacturing in Jabotabek in each year of the survey. We use data for the
whole province of West Java when examining compliance rather than the smaller region
13 Certain labor intensive companies  and small  firms can apply for a 12 month postponement of the need to
comply but this involves opening their books to the government and a  written agreement  either with the
workers union or with a  majority of workers. As a  result few applications  are made. Rama (1999) reports
that during the early  1990s, there were never more than  135 requests per year nationwide.
'4The average nominal wage bill per worker increased  by 102.7% in Botabek between  1989 and 1996
relative to 83.3 percent  in Jakarta.
15 It was conducted in July in 1994  and in August thereafter.
13of Botabek because of the much smaller sample size for Botabek.'6 The questions are the
standard ones for labor force surveys around the world.'7
Establishing compliance by examining labor force data is more difficult in a
developing country context than in developed countries because of the large role played
by the informal, uncovered sector and the difficulty of identifying informal  sector
workers. The Sakernas does not allow us to clearly identify formal and informal sector
workers. To try and minimize the inclusion of informal sector workers we limited our
sample to those employees aged  10 or more who report working at least 40 hours a week
in the urban manufacturing sector. To increase the probability of being able to discern the
impact of the minimum wage on the distribution of wages we further restrict our sample
to female workers. Female workers are much more likely to receive the minimum wage
than male workers (who are better paid), Rosner (1995).28 Ideally we would limit our
sample to only the clothing/textiles/footwear/  leather sectors of the manufacturing
industry here (as we do when examining the employment impacts) but the sample  size
precludes us from doing so.
Households  in the Sakemnas are asked the province in which they live.  We do not
know the province in which they work. To the extent that individuals travel across
provincial borders to work, this will add some noise to our density plots.
16 The Survei Industri data allows us to calculate  the average wage paid per production worker in  each firm.
The sample is  large enough to allow us to plot the distribution of these averages for firms just in  Botabek.
Although these data are likely to be noisier because of the use of averages, they also show spikes at or close
to the minimum.
7 For example, respondents are asked whether they have worked for at least one hour in  the last week. If
so, for how many hours? Questions are then asked about the sector of  work, whether it is  as an employee or
self-employed,  paid or unpaid. If they are an employee  they are asked the amount of their earnings  in the
last week and the last month.
18 Rosner (1995)  conducted a small survey of  managers - 7 in the footwear industry, 4 in garments and an
official  from a footwear and textiles association. The interviewees  all stated that the factories  with which
they were involved paid the minimum wage or more.  While male workers may earn more than the
minimum, it was reported that female workers more often earned the minimum  only. See also Wolf (1992).
14Figures 2 and 3 plot the kernel density estimates of self-reported monthly wages
at different points in time between  1990 and 1996 for Jakarta residents and West Java
residents respectively.1 9 The monthly minimum wage that is in force at the time is shown
by a vertical  line. In some cases the new and old minimum are shown (the old minimum
being the vertical line to the left). The difficulty in discerning a spike is increased by the
smoothing of the kernel density estimator.  Nevertheless, spikes at or close to the
minimum are evidenced in most of the figures.
Table Al  in the appendix shows the timing of minimum wage increases.  The
minimum wage in West Java was .the equivalent of Rpl600/day from the  Ist April  1990
until June  1" 1991. It then increased to Rp2100/day.  Figure 2a plots the distribution of
wages in West Java for the last three quarters of 1990, Figure 2b for the first two quarters
of 1991  and Figure 2c the last two quarters in  1991. (Plotting the quarters separately was
only possible in the earlier years in which the quarterly data was collected.) In all three
figures there is a distinct peak almost exactly at the current minimum and there is no
discernible peak at the old minimum just after the minimum increased (figure 2c). 7
There is some evidence  in figure 2b that the increase on June  1st was anticipated because
there is also a peak close to what was to become the new minimum. The minimum wage
stayed at Rp2 100/day until  1st September  1992. Figure 2d shows that the spike in the
distribution remained at this level in the first three quarters of that year, it then moved to
the right when the new minimum became effective in the 4th quarter.  This pattern of the
peak shifting with the minimum wage increases  is repeated  in the subsequent years. Also
19 A Epanechnikov kernel was used. The bandwidth was chosen by visual inspection of the plots, as
suggested by Deaton (1997).  Observations greater than Rp200000 were dropped to allow us to focus on the
lower portion of the distribution.
20 The daily rates in Table AI are converted to monthly equivalents assuming a six day working week.
15as expected in an economy with a positive inflation rate, the longer a minimum has been
in place, the greater the percentage of the population that receives above the minimum.
The figures for Jakarta (figures 3a-g) show similar evidence that the minimum
was binding. Only in 1990 (figure 3a) and 1992 (figure  3c) is there no spike at or close to
the minimum.21
As anticipated,  in both provinces a sizeable portion of the sample is receiving less
than the minimum wage. These people are likely to be employed by small manufacturing
businesses  in the informal  sector. The proportion receiving  less than the minium is higher
in West Java which is less urban and the formal sector plays a smaller role.
5. Establishment Level  Data
Having established that the minimum wage legislation is taken seriously, we now turn
our attention to examining the employment impact of minimum wages. The data source
we use is the Annual Survey of Manufacturing Firms (Survei Tahunan Perusahaan
Industri, SI) from 1990 to  1996.22 These data are also collected by BPS. The data are
collected at the establishment  level and the survey is a census of all manufacturing
establishments in the country with twenty or more employees.  Owing to the size of these
establishments, they are considered here as constituting the formal or covered sector of
the labor market.
The survey provides detailed data on the establishments'  businesses. This includes  5-
digit industry codes, information on the number of employees  (broken down by
21  The figure for the first three quarters of 1991  shows a peak just beyond the minimum. This is  not
surprising given that the minimum had already been in  place for  12 months. Rama (1999) had similarly
examined the Sakemas data by province for such spikes - although he only used the 1993 data and presents
only one figure in  the paper (for West Java ). He also finds that "minimum wages affect the shape of the
wage distribution".
16production and non-production workers), the total wage bill, the percentage of foreign
ownership, the proportion of the output that is exported, value-added per worker and land
rental payments.  Detailed geographic location information is also provided so we know
whether a firm is in Jakarta or Botabek and also whether it is in one of the sub-districts
immediately adjacent to the Jakarta/West  Java border.23 Establishment codes allow firms
to be tracked over time.
There are 1224 firms involved in the clothing/textiles/footwear/leather  sector
(excluding  batik) in Jabotabek in 1991  and 1519 in 1996.24
6.  Empirical Methodology
We obtain estimates of the employment impact by comparing the average change
in the number of workers employed within firms in Jakarta with the average change
within like firms over the border in Botabek.25 This methodology thus differences  out
business cycle employment effects which are common to both Jakarta and Botabek. Any
systematic difference  in the Botabek and Jakarta averages is attributed to the only known
difference between the regions - different minimum wages.  One thus needs to ensure that
there are no other differences between either firms or economic conditions  in the two
regions that could account for the different employment patterns. There are no other
22 We do not utilize data beyond 1996 for fear of contaminating  our estimates with the impact of  the Asian
crisis which began in mid-1997.
23  There are four levels of geographic division in Indonesia - provinces, districts (kabupaten/kotamadya),
sub-districts (kecamatan) and villages (desa).
24 This is after dropping a small number of irregular observations and batik firms. An examination of the 5
digit industry codes for those with a 2-digit code of  32  revealed that batik manufacturing  is especially
concentrated  in Jakarta while there is very little batik manufacturing  in Botabek. Because of its traditional
origins, these firms are also more likely than others to be informal in nature.  All other industries were
pretty evenly spread across Jakarta and Botabek.
5 The Survei Industri data provide information on the number of workers employed rather than the hours
worked by employees.  Most production workers in the clothing, textiles, leather and footwear industry
17administrative reasons of which we are aware.  There are however some systematic
differences between firms in the two areas. Table 3 shows that on average firms are larger
in Botabek than Jakarta and there are a larger percentage of foreign owned firms in
Botabek. This suggests that firms in Jakarta may be more informal and may not be using
the same level of technology as firms in Botabek. For this reason we calculate matched
difference-in-difference  estimates where we match on the basis of value-added per
worker which acts as a proxy for the firm's production technology.26 Our estimator is:
JJA




where J denotes the number of per-worker-value-added  cells, nj is the number of firms in
value-added cell j,  and AY-Jg is the simple average across firms in Jakarta within value-
added cellj of either  1) the change in the number of production workers employed
between the initial and base year (for estimates in terms of changes in the number of
workers);  or 2) the proportional  change in the number of production workers employed
between the initial and base year (in the case of proportional  estimates).  AyJBOT is
similarly defined for Botabek. That is, we calculate the employment change for each
firm, calculate the average of this change within value-added cells for Botabek and
Jakarta and then calculate a weighted average of the difference in these.
work full-time and work eight hour shifts (Wolf,  1992) so examining changes in  the number of workers
captures any significant employment changes.
26 We also calculated matched difference-in-difference  estimates on the basis of the predicted probability of
a firm being in  Jakarta using the propensity score method of Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). These
propensity scores were calculated from a logit with the dependent variable equalled one if the firm was in
Jakarta and 0 if in  Botabek. The independent  variables were dummy variables reflecting the firms' 3-digit
industry codes (clothing/textiles/footwear  or leather),  the proportion of foreign ownership,  the proportion of
18In addition to matching by value-added  per worker, it is also desirable to
differentiate  by firm size and foreign ownership. Not only does this increase the
likelihood of matching like with like, it also allows different firm types to experience
different minimum wage impacts. For example,  the increase in the minimum wage may
constitute a greater burden on smaller businesses and so may affect them
disproportionately.  Similarly the behavior of foreign and domestic firmis may differ
owing to their different cost structures and the greater ability of multinational  firms to
absorb cost increases.  For this reason we calculate separate  estimates for small domestic
firms (20-150 workers), large domestic firms (more than 150 workers with no foreign
ownership)  and large foreign firms (more than  150 workers with non-zero foreign
ownership).27 Small foreign firms are excluded because they are very few in number.
We focus on the employment of production workers because they are likely to be
less skilled than non-production  workers, more likely to be receiving the minimum wage
and so more likely to be affected by the minimum wage increase. It may be that firms
react to increases in the minimum wage by reallocating their labor demand towards more
skilled workers. Below we also check to see whether any decrease  in the employment of
production workers is offset by an increase in ihe employment of non-production
workers.
Finally, the base year must be a year in which minimum wages are equal across
the two regions so that we are comparing changes from a position where we would expect
firm employment to be the same in both regions. It is also important to match on the basis
of value-added per worker in the base year because it may be affected by differing
total output that is exported and value-added per worker. Nearest neighbour matching was used in this case.
Both methods generated the same results so we just present the results from matching on value-added.
27 Almost all of the firms with some foreign ownership are majority foreign owned.
19minimum wages. The minimum wage is equal across both regions from 1994 onwards -
thus 1994,  1995 and 1996 are potential base years.  The reported estimates use 1996 as the
base year. This year is preferred on theoretical  grounds because it is the most distant from
the period in which the minimum wages differed. If the changes in the difference between
minimum wages in Jakarta and West Java take more than a year to affect unemployment
then employment in 1995 will still be contaminated  by the different minimums and so not
be an appropriate base year.28
Center-Periphery  Differences
Calculating the matched estimates aims to ensure that we are comparing  like firms
across the two regions. We may still be concerned  however about differing economic
conditions between the periphery of the city (Botabek) and those in the center in Jakarta
proper. Note though that it is not accurate to characterize Jabotabek as consisting of a
dense manufacturing center with less dense extremities.  Henderson,  Kuncoro and
Nasution (1996)  characterize Jabotabek as a "multi-centered  metropolitan area (with
some centers  in Botabek) rather than one dominated by central city employment."  They
find no significant correlation between the distance from the center of Jabotabek and
employment density in 1991. They also emphasize that unlike the U.S. pattern of
development which might see industry moving out of the center to the periphery of cities,
the center of Jabotabek (particularly north Jakarta) is still a vibrant and growing
manufacturing center. Nevertheless, we are able to test whether there is a systematic
difference in employment growth between firms in Jakarta and Botabek in 1994-1996
28 Note that if firms are still adjusting to the minimum wage changes in 1996 (two years after the minimums
became equal) then this should generate systematic  differences between the regions duringl994-1996 or
1995-1996. The results show no such systematic differences between these years.
20and 1995-1996 when the minimum wages were the same in both regions. We also
conduct a number of sensitivity tests which reduce or remove  the propensity for center-
periphery differences to bias the results. First we restrict the sample to those firms that
are only very close to the Jakarta-Botabek  border. Second, we construct an alternative
control group from Botabek firms. Finally we use an estimator that subtracts off any
persistent difference in employment growth rate between Jakarta and Botabek. These will
be explained in more detailed below.
Firm Openings and Closures
It is only possible to calculate the matched employment impact estimate  shown in
equation  1 for firms that are open in the initial and final year of the comparison.  For
instance, the estimate of the employment impact between  1990 and 1996 uses data on
only those firms that existed in these two years.29 This enables us to identify whether
employment decreased in firms that still exist in 1996,  as predicted by the neo-classical
model. Minimum wage increases will lead to further welfare  losses if they result in less
firms opening and more firms closing. To examine this issue we also calculate difference-
in-differences in the net rate of firm openings between Botabek and Jakarta.
7. Results
Table 4 reports the difference-in-difference  (DID) estimates  of the employment impact
when we match on value-added per worker.  Five value-added per worker cells were
29 Of firms that existed in  1991  (1995), 57% (86.4%) of  firms are still in operation in 1996. Using a
balanced  panel of this sort is not unusual. Bell (1997) for example ignores firm closures.  Card and Krueger
attempted to control for closures  by treating employment  as zero in  closed firms.  Including closed firms in
the sample in  this way is  not possible when calculating matched difference-in-differences  because we don't
know what the value-added per worker would have been in the base year (1996) for the firms that closed
prior to that date
21used.30 It presents the employment impact estimates in two forms:  as the impact on the
number of production workers and the proportion of production workers employed.  A
negative estimate indicates a greater decrease in employment in Botabek than in Jakarta
and so is consistent with the neoclassical prediction.
The first thing to note is that there is no systematic  difference between the regions
in the absence of minimum wage changes. None of the estimates  are statistically
significant for the periods in which the minimum wages were the same in both regions
(1994-1996  and 1995-1996).
Examining the estimates for the years in which the minimum wage differed across
the two regions shows no significant employment impact for large firms - domestic or
foreign.  All of the estimates for large foreign firms are negative but insignificant.
Similarly, all estimates for large domestic firms are statistically insignificant (some
positive and others negative). This is true of the estimates in terms of the number of
workers and those in terms of the proportion of workers. The only statistically significant
impacts occur for small, domestic firms. The point estimates in terms of the number of
workers for the period 1991-1996 and  1992-1996 show a negative impact and are
statistically significant (at the  10% and 5%) levels respectively. The estimate for 1990 to
1996 is also negative and is very close to significant at the  10% level (p-value = 0.101).
The estimates in terms of proportions are also negative  and significant at the  10% level
for 1991-96 and 1992-96.
Hence it appears that the larger increase in the Botabek minimum may have
reduced employment in small domestic firms relative to Jakarta. The point estimates are
substantial  in size. For example, between  1991  and 1996 firms in Botabek are estimated
30 The results are not sensitive to the cell definitions. The cut-off points are 2000, 4000, 8000 and  15000
22to have lost approximately 22 workers per firm relative to Jakarta. (Note that actual
employment grew but by less than it did in Jakarta.)  The point estimates decrease in
magnitude as the initial year moves from  1991 to 1996. A comparison of the point
estimates for 1991-96 and  1992-96 suggest that almost half of the total relative loss
between  1991 and 1996 occurred in the first year. The magnitude of the relative
employment loss in Botabek between  1991  amd  1992 probably reflects not only the
increase in the Botabek minimum relative to Jakarta over that period but also the lagged
effects coming from the much larger relative increase between  1990 and 1991. The
magnitude of the estimate for 1990- 1996 however presents a bit of a puzzle because
although the difference in minimum wages between  1990 and 1996 is larger than between
1991  and 1996, the employment impact estimate is smaller in magnitude than the  1991-
96 estimate. This may reflect the relative imprecision of the estimates. (The confidence
intervals for the 1990-1996 and the  1991-1996  estimates overlap considerably.)  It may
also reflect lower compliance  with the legislation in 1990 which is commonly viewed as
the first year in which enforcement was treated seriously.
In proportional terms, the point estimates are also large. Employment  in small
firms in Jakarta grew at an average  rate of 41%  more than in West Java between 1991
and 1996. The proportional  estimate is significantly different from zero only at the 10%
level and the  10% confidence  interval is 1.4% to 81% . The point estimate for 1992 to
1996 suggests a 16% relative  employment gain in Jakarta.
These results are consistent with Rama (1999) who found that employment in
smaller firms may have been adversely affected by the minimum wage increases, while
large firms were unaffected (or even experienced a small positive effect).
thousand rupiah per worker per annum.
23Sensitivity Tests
As noted above, for neither small firms, large firms, domestic or foreign firms is there a
systematic difference  in the changes in employment between Jakarta and Botabek in the
period  1995 to 1996 - when the minimum wages are the same in the two regions. This is
consistent with our identifying assumption of no systematic difference in employment
patterns in the absence of minimum wage differences. Nevertheless,  we conduct the
following sensitivity tests to further reduce the concerns that center-periphery difference
are driving the results.
a.  Firms  close to the Jakarta/West  Java border
The first sensitivity test conducted  restricts the sample to only sub-districts (kecamatan)
that are directly on the West Java/Jakarta border.  Sub-districts are quite small areas.
There are about 130 subdistricts in Jabotabek.  Looking only at this narrow band reduces
the probability of the estimates being contaminated by systematic differences  in
economic conditions between the center and in the periphery. Table 5 presents the results
for changes in the number of workers.3'  The results for large firms - domestic and
foreign - are the same as the original results. The estimates are statistically insignificant
for every pair of years. The point estimates for small firms still suggest a negative impact
for 1990-96,  1991-96 and 1992-96, however unlike the previous set of results, the
estimates for small firms are now also statistically insignificant.
b. High Wage/Low  Wage Comparisons
3' The proportional  results are qualitatively the same and are available from the authors  on request.
24The second sensitivity test compares high wage firms in Botabek with low wage firms,
also in Botabek.  Using a control group from within Botabek is another way of avoiding
the problems that might arise from comparing the center with the periphery.32 High wage
firms are defined to be those firms who in the initial year on average are already paying
the 1996 minimum.33 They thus do not have to increase the wages they are paying to
meet the new minimum and as such should be unaffected  by the minimum wage increase.
Low wage firms are all other firms.  The estirrmates in Table 5 show that there is no
significant difference in the change in employment in large foreign low wage firms in
Botabek relative to large foreign high wage firms in the same area. For large domestic
firms some of the estimates are statistically significant at the  10% level.  They however
suggest a positive employment impact. The estimates for small domestic  firms are
statistically insignificant.
c. Difference-in-Difference-Difference  Estimates
The final sensitivity test conducted involves calculating difference-in-difference-in-
difference (DIDID) estimators.  That is, we subtract the change in employment
experienced by the firm between  1995 and 1996 (when minimum wages in Jakarta and
Botabek were the same) from the change experienced when the minimum wages were
changing by different amounts. Thus this estimator allows that there may be a systematic
difference in employment growth rates between  firms in Botabek and Jakarta (between
1995 and 1996) and differences this out when calculating the employment impact
estimator.  More formally, the DIDID estimator is the same as the straight difference-in-
32  It  does raise the question though as to whether high wage firms are an appropriate  control - if they are
the same as low wage firms, why are they paying higher wages?
3  This is  on the basis of dividing the firm's wage bill by the total number of workers.
25difference estimator above except that AY2  and  AK  OT are now calculated  as  the
simple average across firms in Jakarta within value-added cell j  of the change in
employment net of that which is expected on the basis of the employment change
between  1995 and 1996. For instance, when calculating the estimate of the minimum
wage increase between  1991  and 1996,  AY  JAK  is the simple average across firms in
Jakarta of the change in employment from  1991 to 1996 (within the same value-added
cell) minus five times the employment change experienced by the firm between  1995 and
1996.
We have already seen that the employment impacts between  1995  and 1996 in Table
4 are all statistically insignificantly  different from zero. This suggests that there is no
need to do difference-in-difference-in-difference  estimates.  The D-I-D-I-D estimates are
presented here for completeness.
Table 5 shows that this method produces insignificant employment  impact estimates
for large domestic  firms and small domestic firms. For large foreign firms it results in
some positive impacts.  That the estimate of the employment change  1995 to 1996 was
insignificant, paired with the observation that the DIDID point estimates for large foreign
firms are large and significant only in the later years, rather than in the earlier years when
the largest relative minimum wage changes occurred,  suggests that less reliance should be
placed on these estimates.
In summary our results provide no evidence that minimum wage increases
decrease formal sector employment in large firms. Not one of the 58 estimates for large
firms suggests such a relationship.  The initial estimates for small firms do show a
26negative  impact in some years.  This effect however disappears when alternative control
groups are used.
Rates of Firm  Openings and Closures
The estimates above were calculated for firms that operated throughout the entire period
and so ignored firm openings and closures. Table 6 presents the difference-in-difference
results for the rate of net firm openings. These are calculated by subtracting the change in
the net opening rate between the initial year and the base period in Jakarta from the
similarly calculated change in Botabek:
{(BOT  -NBO  )  (NBO  -NO  NA  NjC;K )_(NJA  -NcA  2
q7 9296 =  NB
95 N91 N"  9JAJi'  }  (2)
BOT  BOT  JAK  jAK
where  NBOO9T6  denotes the number of frms in Botabek that opened in 1996,  NBcO9T6
denotes the number of firms in Botabek that closed in 1996,  NBOT  denotes the total
number of firms in Botabek in  1996 and the variables for Jakarta are defined
analogously. 34
Of the  12 estimates presented in Table 6, only one - for large foreign firms
between  1992 and 1996 - is significant (p-value= 0.064). It however is positive and
suggests that for foreign firms the larger increase in the minimum wage in Botabek was
associated with an increase in the net opening rate of firms in that province.  Hence, table
34 These estimates are in  terms of the number of firms rather than the number of production workers
because they are calculated  from the backcast  SI data which doesn't provide information on the number of
workers.  The backcast data supplements  the regular SI (lata. Firms first appear in the regular data set when
they are initially detected by BPS. If this is not actually the firm's first year of operation as a'medium or
large  firm, a shorter array of supplementary questions is asked about previous  years of operation and forms
the backcast data. A comparison of the regular SI data weith the backcast data revealed that a not
insignificant number of finns were operating prior to their first year in the regular data. Hence it is more
276 provides no evidence in favor of a negative employment impact coming through firm
openings or closures.35
The Informal Labor Market
The theoretical models discussed above that incorporate an uncovered
sector predict a reallocation of labor from the formal (or covered)  sector to the informal
(or uncovered) sector as a result of minimum wage increases in the former. Workers who
are displaced from the uncovered sector will move to the uncovered sector.36 Given that
we find little evidence of the predicted negative employment impact in the formal  sector,
we would not expect to find a large employment impact in the informal sector - although
if people did lose their jobs in small, domestic  firms then this may result in an increase in
informal sector employment.  We examined the Labor Force Survey for an increase in the
percentage of working women who are working in the informal manufacturing  sector. As
mentioned above, it is difficult to clearly identify whether an individual works in the
formal or informal sector. Here we define the informal sector to be those who are self-
employed without regular help or engaged in unpaid work.37 We calculate standard
difference-in-differences  for the period 1990 to  1996 and find no significant  difference
between Jakarta and West Java in terms of the percentage of working women who are in
the informal sector.
appropriate to use the backcast data for the examination  of firm openings and closures. Note also that we
are treating firms with less than 20 employees  as being closed, or not yet opened.
35 The reported estimates are not broken down by firm size. This is because most new firns are likely to be
small and firms may downsize  before finally closing. The estimates however remain insignificant if broken
down by the size of the firm.  We also calculated difference-in-differences  for opening rates and closure
rates separately.  These produced qualitatively similar results.
36 There may also be some movement in the other direction. Some uncovered sector workers might be
tempted to quit their low paying jobs and choose to queue for the now more lucrative  covered sector jobs.
Although individuals are likely to be able to work in the uncovered  sector in Jabotabek while "queuing" for
formal  sector work).  This effect will be larger the higher the turnover rate in  the covered  sector.
28It would also be interesting to examine the impact of the minimum wage increase
on informal sector earnings but these data are not available for Indonesia.38
8. Possible Explanations
With recent minimum wage studies not finding strong negative employment
impacts, and some finding a positive impact, attention has turned to possible theoretical
causes of a positive or insignificant association between minimum wages and
employment.  The most obvious contender is the text book monopsony model which
shows that if the employer is a monopsonist then, over a certain range, minimum wages
need not cause employment to decrease. The traditional  monopsony model is often not
very palatable because most industries  (as is the case here) cannot be characterized  as
monopsonies. However,  Card and Krueger (1995) argue that in the short term search
costs lock employees into working for their current employer and so the only way for
other firms to increase employment is to offer a higher wage. Hence, the monopsony
result may even hold in markets that appear to be perfectly competitive.
Another candidate  explanation for an increase in employment is that firms react to
the increase in their labor costs by increasing  the efficiency of their labor force (or
employees raise their effort levels as in efficiency wage models).  See Brown (1999). The
monopsony model is not very amenable to testing. We are however able to examine
37 Comparisons  will also be complicated by the high mobility of  workers across the Botabek/Jakarta  border.
38 There is  no data source in  Indonesia that allows identification of informal sector employees and collects
earnings data at regular enough intervals to allow comparisons with the minimum wage. An obvious
alternative to factory work for formal sector female employees who find themselves unemployed is  to work
as a  household servant. The income module of the Survei Socio-Economic Nasional (Susenas) which is
conducted three-yearly  identifies live-in household servants but does not allow us to identify their earnings
separately  from other householders.  We did however calculate differences-in-difference  estimates from the
proportion of the adult population working as live-in household servants  in the  1993 and  1996 Susenas
surveys and they also showed no significant  impact of the minimum wage  increase.
29changes in firms value-added per worker and so assess whether there is any evidence of
the increases in firm productivity (via the efficiency wage,  or any other, route).
Admittedly the value-added data are likely to be somewhat noisy but we calculate
standard difference-in-difference  estimates for value-added per worker for small
domestic, large foreign and large domestic firms. We found no significant  difference in
changes in value-added  per worker between Jakarta and Botabek.39
Another testable prediction put forward in the literature  is whether firms substitute
towards skilled labor following a minimum wage increase.  Given that we do not pick up
any decrease in unskilled workers in large firms, we would not expect to see any such
increase in the employment on skilled workers in these firms. However, if our estimates
in table 4 are accurate for small, domestic firms then it may be that the employment of
skilled workers has increased in these firms, while unskilled worker employment has
declined.  Difference-in-difference  estimates of the number of non-production (skilled)
workers however reveal no significant difference in changes  in non-production
employment between Jakarta and Botabek.
What explanations remain then for our insignificant results? There are three main
possibilities. First, maybe labor costs in Indonesia (and other developing countries) are
such a low share of total costs that even large percentage increases yield negligible
increases in total costs. ILO (2000) reports that in the European Union clothing sector
labor costs average 60% of total costs excluding raw material costs. The comparable
figure for clothing firms in our sample is 60.4%. Hence, the insignificant results cannot
be explained by unusually low labor cost shares.  Labor's cost share is however
significantly lower for large firms than small firms which may explain some of the
39 Results available from authors on request.
30difference  between firms of different sizes. Labor costs are 31.2% of total costs for small
firms and 20.1% for large firms.
A second possible explanation is that Indonesian manufacturers may have been
able to increase their prices in response to the increasing costs. ILO (2000) shows that
Indonesia has the lowest labor costs in the world in the textiles, clothing and footwear
sectors, significantly lower than China and India. If demand is relatively  inelastic in this
range, firms may have been able to increase their prices and maintain their output.
Increased prices would theoretically increase value-added  per worker and so should have
been picked up in difference-in-difference  estimates of value-added per worker (if the
value-added data are sufficiently accurate). Alternatively, maybe profi t margins are so
large in the export market (as a result of the low labor costs) that the firms merely were
able to accept slight profit declines.
A further possible explanation is that even with a 35% relative  increase in
minimum wages in Botabek relative to Jakarta and information on all firms (of over 20
employees)  in the Jabotabek region, the employment impact may be still too small, or the
employment data too inaccurate, to allow the identification of the negative effect. It is not
clear how the data could be improved - the sample size cannot be increased and there is
no reason to suspect that the data is unusually noisy. On balance this suggests that the
employment impact is not very large.
8. Conclusion
The results presented above provide no evidence that increases in minimum wages
reduce employment in large firms - foreign or domestic. Not one of the many estimates
presented here are negative for these firms. In contrast, the base difference-in-difference
31estimates for small, domestic firms do show a negative employment impact. There was
no evidence of more firm closures or less openings resulting from the minimum wage
increase for any type of firms. More research is needed - in the face of the ambiguity of
the results presented here for small firms and the lack of such research in other countries
- to establish the robustness of these findings.
With regard to foreign firms, although they have the reputation of being very
sensitive to wage relativities, the evidence presented here shows that they do not seem to
reduce employment in the face of minimum wage increases.  In the six year period
studied, there was also no evidence of relocation in response to the minimum wage
increases.  It may be that the wage increases,  although quite substantial, were small
relative to relocation costs. Alternatively, six years may be too short a period in which to
capture relocation decisions. It may also be that with Indonesia offering such low labor
costs (even after the increases) firms have nowhere cheaper to go.
In addition to our finding of no significant effect on firm openings and closures, it is
noteworthy that there was a 44% increase in the number of large foreign firms operating
in Jabotabek between  1991 and  1996, during which period the real minimum wages
increased by slightly more than 50% in real terms. The impact of minimum wage
increases on foreign firm exit and entry decisions is an area worthy of further research.
As a final proviso, these estimates are calculated from data covering a period of
sustained economic  growth. It is not clear to what extent they carry over to the present,
more fragile, post-Asian crisis situation.
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34Table 1:  Monthly Minimum Wages in Jakarta and Botabek
(Average over Calendar Year in Rupiah)
Year  Botabek  Jakarta  % Difference Between
Botabek and Jakarta
90  41186  55800  35.5
91  50264  57571  14.5
92  60229  67536  12.1
93  69086  79714  15.4
94  100971  100971  0
95  122229  122229  0
96  147557  147557  0
Table 2: Monthly Cash Wage  Paid to Production Workers  (SI)
Mean Cash Wages  Median Cash Wages
Jakarta  Botabek  % diff  Jakarta  Botabek  % diff
1986  841  795.5  -5 4  630.1  592.5  -6.0
1989  1076  1056  -1.9  817.6  717  -12.3
1991  1091  963  -11.7  936  791  -15.5
1992  1334  1137  -14.8  1050  930  -11.4
1993  1507  1392  -7.6  1218  1175  -3.5
1994  1485  1695  14.1  1350  1380  2.2
1995  1727  1769  2.4  1500  1545  3.0
1996  1972  2140  8.5  1740  1846  6.1
1989-1996  83.3  102.7  19.4  112.8  157.5  44.6
*The  1990 figures are omitted because the Si data for this year does not allow identification of
the firms' location beyond province. (We were able to calculate the DID estimates for established
firms in 1990 by keeping only those firms in 1990 that were operating in Botabek or Jakarta  in
1996.)
Table 3: Comparisons  of Botabek and Jakarta Firms, 1996
Jakarta  Botabek
Number of workers per firm  159.7  424.1
Firms with some foreign ownership (%)  4.4  17.2
Value-added  per worker ('000 Rp  p.a.)  7112  11294
Proportion of Product  Exported  12.0  31.0
N  985  534
35Table 4: Jabotabek  Matched  Difference-in-Difference  Estimates
(Matching on basis of Value-Added)
BASE YEAR  = 1996
CHANGE  IN THE  NUMBER  OF PRODUCTION  WORKERS  EMPLOYED  (Target Year to 1996)
SmalUDomestic  Large/Domestic  Large/Foreign
Target Year  Base Year  NBOT  NJAK  Coeff  Std Error  t  NBOT  NJAK  Coeff  Std  Error  t  NBOT  NJAK  Coeff  Std  Error  t
1990  1996  52  269  -12.4  7.57  -1.64  113  82  40.7  46.16  0.88  27  17  -94.2  146.4  -0.64
1991  1996  67  322  -22.1  12.23  -1.81*  144  94  35.4  51.4  0.69  46  21  -99.7  124.8  -0.80
1992  1996  79  399  -12.3  5.6  -2.20**  155  108  32.69  44.62  0.73  58  29  -45.2  96.5  -0.47
1993  1996  98  458  -5.05  4.67  -1.08  172  119  9.81  34.4  0.29  65  29  -36.4  82.6  -0.44
1994  1996  126  528  -3.13  3.21  -0.98  191  127  3.81  30.2  0.13  72  31  -98.8  106.4  -0.93
1995  1996  176  634  -2.15  1.83  -1.17  209  147  -18.7  19  -0.98  75  32  -159.8  99.6  -1.60
PROPORTIONAL  CHANGE  IN THE  NUMBER OF  PRODUCTION  WORKERS  EMPLOYED  (Target  Year to 1996)
Small/Domestic  Large/Domestic  Large/Foreign
Target Year  Base Year  Coeff  Std Error  t  Coeff  Std Error  t  Coeff  Std Error  t
1990  1996  -0.20  0.154  -1.30  0.054  0.078  0.70  -0.077  0.235  -0.33
1991  1996  -0.41  0.240  -1.71*  0.037  0.081  0.46  -0.028  0.159  -0.18
1992  1996  -0.16  0.094  -1.70*  0.032  0.072  0.44  0.007  0.141  0.05
1993  1996  -0.016  0.061  -0.26  -0.031  0.054  -0.57  -0.036  0.122  -0.30
1994  1996  0.01  0.051  0.20  -0.039  0.05  -0.78  -0.076  0.121  -0.63
1995  1996  -0.006  0.033  -0.18  -0.047  0.035  -1.34  -0.158  0.105  -1.50Table  5: Sensitivity Tests
(Matched  Difference-in-Difference  Estimates  - Matching on basis of Value-Added)
CHANGE  IN THE NUMBER  OF PRODUCTION  WORKERS  EMPLOYED  (Target Year to 1996)
REGENCIES  ON THE JAKARTAIWEST JAVA BORDER
SmalVDomestic  Large/Domestic  Large/Foreign
Tgt Year Base Year  N  NJAK  Coeffstd error  t  NB°T  NJAK  Coeff  std error  t  N  N  Coeff  std error  t
1990  1996  18  174  -9.83  11.76  -0.84  28  77  7.26  59.3  0.12  6  16  -206.7  99.7  -2.07*
1991  1996  23  219  -10.2  6.95  -1.47  43  87  19.4  65.2  0.3  17  20  -94.7  137.5  -0.69
1992  1996  30  275  -5.41  6.77  -0.8  45  101  19.6  63.4  0.31  17  28  -27  106.5  -0.25
1993  1996  36  320  2.13  5.57  0.38  47  111  -15.9  49.7  -0.32  18  28  -48  96.9  -0.5
1994  1996  47  375  3.53  2.88  1.23  52  117  10.7  37.9  0.28  20  30  -146.4  139.1  -1.05
1995  1996  61  461  2.07  1.43  1.45  57  134  -29.7  21.7  -1.37  20  31  -176.  133.2  -1.32
HIGH WAGE/LOW WAGE
Small/Domestic  Large/Domestic  Large/Foreign
Tgt YearBase Year  Niow  Nhigh  Coeffstd error  t  NIow  Nhigh  Coeff  std error  t  Niow  Nhigh  Coeff  std error  t
1990  1996  48  4  -18.1  6.0  3.03**  101  12  -18.4  91.7  0.20  23  4  15.3  53.0  0.29
1991  1996  58  9  -12.8  15.5  -0.83  123  21  97.6  54.4  1.79*  36  10  86.9  123.6  0.70
1992  1996  64  15  -4.82  14.3  -0.34  109  46  120.2  69.1  1.74*  35  23  79.8  86.7  0.92
1993  1996  75  23  10.8  13.7  0.79  103  69  -19.4  55.2  -0.35  25  40  95.8  81.4  1.18
1994  1996  80  46  6.1  9.4  0.65  88  103  28  37.8  0.74  28  44  84.4  56  1.51
1995  1996  99  177  3.6  3.2  1.13  76  133  42.4  25.6  1.66*  13  62  14.4  47.7  0.30
DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES
SmallDomestic  Large/Domestic  Large/Foreign
Tgt Year Base Year  N  NJAK  Coeff Std  Error  t  N  °T  NJAK  Coeff  Std  Error  t  NBOT  N  Coeff  Std Error  t
1990  1996  52  267  12.2  21.79  0.56  112  80  85.0  159.5  0.53  27  17  1261.3  618.1  2.04
1991  1996  67  321  -8.85  13.67  -0.65  143  92  91.0  114.8  0.79  46  21  510.2  383.6  1.33
1992  1996  79  396  -3.05  9.99  -0.31  154  106  87.3  83.6  1.04  58  29  263.6  191.9  1.37
1993  1996  98  457  6.13  6.58  0.93  171  117  48.8  56.3  0.87  65  29  226.4  133.2  1.70*
1994  1996  126  526  4.21  2.82  1.49  191  125  31.8  29.6  1.07  72  31  226.2  105.2  2.15**
1Table  6: Difference-in-Difference  Estimates of Net Openings
(1996 - Target Year)
ALL FIRMS
Net Opening Rate in Botabek  Net Opening Rate in Jakarta  DID Estimate
(%)  (%)  (%)  t-value
Target Year  1996  Tgt Year  1996  Tgt Year
1992  -2.19  5.39  -7.78  3.33  3.53  1.11
1993  -2.19  3.74  -7.78  -0.24  -0.55  -0.18
1994  -2.19  4.93  -7.78  1.51  2.17  0.77
1995  -2.19  7.6  -7.78  1.68  -0.33  -0.12
DOMESTIC  FIRMS
Net Opening Rate in Botabek  Net Opening Rate in Jakarta  DID Estimate
(%)  (%)  (%)  t-value
Target Year  1996  Tgt Year  1996  Tgt Year
1992  -2.67  4.31  -7.76  2.59  3.37  0.96
1993  -2.67  3.65  -7.76  -2.43  -0.99  -0.3
1994  -2.67  4.70  -7.76  1.89  2.28  0.72
1995  -2.67  9.19  -7.76  1.89  -2.21  -0.72
FOREIGN  FIRMS
Net Opening Rate in Botabek  Net Opening  Rate in Jakarta  DID  Estimate
(%)  (%)  (%)  t-value
Target Year  1996  Tgt Year  1996  Tgt Year
1992  0  10.2  -8.33  20.5  18.6  1.85*
1993  0  4.12  -8.33  -1.89  2.32  0.34
1994  0  5.94  -8.33  -5.77  -3.38  -0.43
1995  0  0.93  -8.33  -2.04  5.36  0.64
* Estimates cannot be calculated for 1991  because the SI data do not provide kabupaten  codes for
1990 so don't know the total number of firms operating in that year, as required by Equation 2.Figure 1:
Manufacturing Employment Density in Jabotabek,  1991.
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